“There is no law in Oregon, State, County, or City that requires citizens to wear a mask either in public or in business establishments, nor is there a regulation to require employees or patrons of those establishments to wear a mask.” All that exists is an edict from the Governor of Oregon, who has no authority over any of these matters. See the following:

American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees v. Olson, 338 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1983): “It is well settled that public officials have only such authority as is expressly given them by the constitution and statutes together with those powers and duties which are necessarily implied from the express grant of authority,” 338 N.W.2d, at 100.

In re Benny, 29 B.R. 754, 762 (N.D. Cal. 1983): “[A]m unlawful or unauthorized exercise of power does not become legitimated or authorized by reason of habitude.”

An Oregon Revised Statute does exist that prohibits public businesses from discriminating against those who do not wear a mask. I suggest you read ORS 659A.142. “Discrimination against individual with disability by employment agency, labor organization, place of public accommodation or state government prohibited.”

Employers are not law enforcement agents and have no authority to act as such.

Employers are not medical professionals and have no authority to administer a medical examination or give medical advice, including advice to wear a mask.

If a public business, in the case Wal-Mart refuses entry into its facility for not wearing a mask for health reasons, they are in violation of the Oregon Constitution, which protects free movement against false imprisonment.

No Business is required to comply with a policy that violates Oregon law or my Rights guaranteed under the Oregon Constitution.

Laws are created by legislative bodies such as Congress or the Oregon State Legislature, not Governor Brown. Governors and mayors cannot enact laws. Their executive orders are binding only on government employees and contractors under their jurisdiction.

Because the virus that causes COVID-19 is transmitted through the air and between people who are in close proximity, the Legislative Assembly’s decision to keep the Capitol physically closed to the public while requiring contemporaneous broadcast of all legislative proceedings is not an arbitrary or unreasonable decision, and does not go beyond what is reasonably necessary to enable the legislature to make urgent policy decisions pertaining to the state’s response to the virus and other urgent matters.

Answer: We conclude that it is legal to limit physical access to the Capitol building during the COVID-19 pandemic, for the reasons described in “Overview” above. Public participation in the legislative process is preserved because House and Senate rules require the public to be able to observe legislative proceedings as the proceedings are occurring, and to be allowed to testify, using electronic means, when legislative committees conduct public hearings.

First, it noted that the exclusion of the public "tends to impress the jury with the enormity of the offense for which the accused is to be tried." Second, it noted that a spectator at a trial might hear testimony that would cause the spectator to "recall facts to which he will call attention, and thus aid in establishing the innocence of the accused." Third, the court concluded that the presence of friends and supporters of a criminal defendant could serve to offset the prejudice incident to being charged with a crime. Finally, the court noted that the presence of friends and supporters of witnesses could "enable the court and jury to elicit from that witness the testimony to which the defense or prosecution is entitled."

First, the Legislative Assembly raised crucial objections as to the legality of this petition under both the separation of powers doctrine of the Oregon Constitution and the state PECBA. Because the Legislative Assembly’s initial objections were dropped when RC-010-20 was withdrawn by IBEW, neither question has been answered – and it is crucial that they are. Notwithstanding any relevant objections presented to the ERB, the question of constitutionality should be pursued vigorously through the legal system and ultimately answered by the state courts.

Second, IBEW’s revisions to the proposed bargaining unit do not resolve the myriad of problems identified by your office with the appropriateness of that unit. For example, RC-001-21 now limits the bargaining unit description to various legislative assistants (LAs) and broadly excludes “supervisory, managerial, confidential and caucus employees.” However, such generalities were something the Legislative Assembly specifically objected to in Case No. RC-010-20 (namely, that a similar description was insufficiently broad due to legislators’ unique ability to designate their employees – including LAs – as any one of 90 potential classifications based on their individually assigned job duties, which can include “chief of staff” or other informal roles with supervisory, managerial, or confidential duties). Consequently, the Legislative Assembly’s associated concerns about the number of employees in the proposed unit – and the accuracy of those who may have signed union authorization cards pursuant to ORS 243.682(2) – have also not been addressed.